Control · C-026 · Third Party & Supply Chain
Agent tool and skill vetting
Tools, skills and connectors are reviewed, scanned and approved before an agent may load them, are loaded only from approved sources, and are re-reviewed when they change.
- Control type
- Preventive
- Risks addressed
- 2
- Audience
- Heads-of · Practitioner
- Frameworks
- AML.M0014 · AST01 · AST04 · AST08
- Responsible AI domain
- Lifecycle stage
- Reviewed
- 2026-11-10
What it does
It applies supplier and software assurance to the components agents assemble at run time, including the parts conventional scanning does not read: the natural-language descriptions and instructions that steer the agent. The owner of third-party risk sets the standard and security carries out the review, before first use and again at every change of version.
How to implement it
- Maintain an approved registry; agents load nothing from outside it.
- Review code, declared permissions and descriptions, and check that the three agree.
- Scan for hidden instructions as well as for malicious code.
- Pin versions and verify integrity on load.
- Assign each component an owner and a review date.
- Treat any update as a new submission.
Evidence it operates
Design: a vetting standard and a registry recording, for each component, its source, version, owner, permissions and approval. Operation: the components loaded by agents in production all appear in the registry at the approved version; a test attempt to load an unapproved component is blocked; review records exist for recent updates.
Where it fits
Operates before a component is first used and at every change. It feeds the AI bill of materials and relies on agent sandboxing and isolation to contain what review misses.
Limits
Review reduces the chance of a hostile component and does not remove it; instructions can be obfuscated and behaviour can depend on conditions not present in testing. Vetting is of little use if agents can still load components dynamically from elsewhere. It also depends on publishers behaving consistently between the version reviewed and the version delivered, which is why pinning and integrity checks are part of the control.
Risks this mitigates
Primary mappings
- Agentic supply chain compromise High
- Reviews and approves tools, skills and connectors before an agent may load them. Tools, skills, connectors or sub-agents loaded at run time are malicious, tampered with or silently changed, giving an outside party a route into the agent's actions and data.
- Over-privileged agent skills and tools Medium
- Reviews the permissions each skill requests before approval. Reusable skills and tool definitions request broader permissions than their function needs and run without isolation, enlarging the effect of any misuse.
Framework and clause references
| Framework | Clause | Title |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.M0014 | Verify AI Artifacts Verification of artefacts. |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | AST01 | Malicious Skills Malicious skills. |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | AST04 | Insecure Metadata Checks that metadata matches behaviour. |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | AST08 | Poor Scanning Poor scanning. |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | AST09 | No Governance Gives skills an owner and an approval route. |
| OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 | AST10 | Cross-Platform Reuse Re-vets a skill reused on another platform. |
| OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications | ASI04 | Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Agentic supply chain. |
Related terms
How to cite
Axiom Verity (2026). Agent tool and skill vetting. Reference Library, C-026. https://axiom-verity.com/controls/agent-tool-and-skill-vetting. Reviewed 2026-11-10.
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