Control · C-026 · Third Party & Supply Chain

Agent tool and skill vetting

Tools, skills and connectors are reviewed, scanned and approved before an agent may load them, are loaded only from approved sources, and are re-reviewed when they change.

Control type
Preventive
Risks addressed
2
Audience
Heads-of · Practitioner
Frameworks
AML.M0014 · AST01 · AST04 · AST08
Reviewed
2026-11-10

What it does

It applies supplier and software assurance to the components agents assemble at run time, including the parts conventional scanning does not read: the natural-language descriptions and instructions that steer the agent. The owner of third-party risk sets the standard and security carries out the review, before first use and again at every change of version.

How to implement it

  • Maintain an approved registry; agents load nothing from outside it.
  • Review code, declared permissions and descriptions, and check that the three agree.
  • Scan for hidden instructions as well as for malicious code.
  • Pin versions and verify integrity on load.
  • Assign each component an owner and a review date.
  • Treat any update as a new submission.

Evidence it operates

Design: a vetting standard and a registry recording, for each component, its source, version, owner, permissions and approval. Operation: the components loaded by agents in production all appear in the registry at the approved version; a test attempt to load an unapproved component is blocked; review records exist for recent updates.

Where it fits

Operates before a component is first used and at every change. It feeds the AI bill of materials and relies on agent sandboxing and isolation to contain what review misses.

Limits

Review reduces the chance of a hostile component and does not remove it; instructions can be obfuscated and behaviour can depend on conditions not present in testing. Vetting is of little use if agents can still load components dynamically from elsewhere. It also depends on publishers behaving consistently between the version reviewed and the version delivered, which is why pinning and integrity checks are part of the control.

Risks this mitigates

Primary mappings

Agentic supply chain compromise High
Reviews and approves tools, skills and connectors before an agent may load them. Tools, skills, connectors or sub-agents loaded at run time are malicious, tampered with or silently changed, giving an outside party a route into the agent's actions and data.
Over-privileged agent skills and tools Medium
Reviews the permissions each skill requests before approval. Reusable skills and tool definitions request broader permissions than their function needs and run without isolation, enlarging the effect of any misuse.

Framework and clause references

FrameworkClauseTitle
MITRE ATLASAML.M0014Verify AI Artifacts Verification of artefacts.
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10AST01Malicious Skills Malicious skills.
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10AST04Insecure Metadata Checks that metadata matches behaviour.
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10AST08Poor Scanning Poor scanning.
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10AST09No Governance Gives skills an owner and an approval route.
OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10AST10Cross-Platform Reuse Re-vets a skill reused on another platform.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic ApplicationsASI04Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Agentic supply chain.

Related terms

How to cite

Axiom Verity (2026). Agent tool and skill vetting. Reference Library, C-026. https://axiom-verity.com/controls/agent-tool-and-skill-vetting. Reviewed 2026-11-10.