Term · G-056 · Risk & Assurance

Model Risk Management (MRM)

The discipline of identifying, measuring, controlling and reporting the risk that a model is wrong, misused or misunderstood, across its whole life from development to retirement. It predates AI by decades in banking, and it is the frame UK regulators have chosen for AI in financial services: the PRA's SS1/23 principles have applied to AI models as to any other since May 2024, and were amended in April 2026.

Also known as MRM · model risk

Entry
Long-form
Audience
Board · Heads-of · Practitioner
Tags
model risk management · MRM · SS1/23 · SR 11-7
Reviewed
2026-10-07

Older than AI, and built for it

Banks have been managing model risk formally since at least the US Federal Reserve's SR 11-7 guidance in 2011, because a mispriced derivative or a miscalibrated credit model can lose money quietly for years before anyone notices. The discipline that grew up around that problem has four parts: an inventory of every model in use, an independent validation of each before and during use, a tiering of models by materiality so that effort goes where the exposure is, and named ownership with reporting to the board.

That is a remarkably good fit for AI, and UK regulators have said so explicitly. The PRA's supervisory statement SS1/23, Model risk management principles for banks, took effect on 17 May 2024 and treats AI and machine learning models as models, with the same five principles applied and some specific points about their opacity, their data dependence and the difficulty of validating them. It also requires a board-approved model risk appetite, which is the closest thing UK regulation has to a mandated AI risk appetite.

The PRA amended SS1/23 on 23 April 2026, in its low-impact amendments package LIAF01/26. The changes clarify that its expectations are not conditions for internal model approval, and bring the models internal-model firms use for stress testing under SS1/23 rather than the older SS3/18. Neither change softens how SS1/23 applies to AI; a firm citing the statement should cite the amended version.

The five principles, and what AI does to each

SS1/23 organises the discipline into five principles. Each survives contact with a language model, and each gets harder.

  • Model identification and classification. You cannot manage what you have not listed. An AI model embedded in a vendor product, or a general-purpose model reached through an API, is still a model and still goes in the inventory; see AI inventory. Materiality tiering has to account for a model that touches many decisions lightly rather than one decision heavily.
  • Governance. The board owns the framework and the appetite. Senior management owns the models. For AI this means someone accountable for a model they did not build and cannot fully inspect, which is the third-party risk problem in a governance frame.
  • Model development, implementation and use. Documentation of what the model is for, its limitations and its intended use, so that misuse is recognisable. A model card is the AI-native form of this.
  • Independent model validation. Someone other than the developer tests it before use and periodically after. For a probabilistic model this is testing AI systems against a fixed evaluation set with a threshold, repeated on every version, including the vendor's silent ones; see model versioning.
  • Model risk mitigants. Compensating controls for known weaknesses: human review at material decisions, output validation, monitoring for drift, and a plan for what happens when the model has to be switched off.

What changes for generative and third-party models

Three things in particular strain a traditional MRM framework, and every firm applying SS1/23 to AI has had to answer them.

The model is not yours. A foundation model reached through an API cannot be validated in the classical sense; its training data, weights and update schedule are the provider's. Validation becomes a test of the assembled system in the firm's own use, against the firm's own evaluation set, with the provider's own claims treated as due diligence input rather than evidence.

The model changes without telling you. Provider updates alter behaviour without a version number the firm controls. The mitigant is the firm's own regression suite run on a schedule, and a contractual right to notice; see performance regression.

The output is not a number. Classical validation compares predictions to outcomes. Generated text has no ground truth in the same sense, so validation has to be built from structural checks, sampled human review and, where the use case allows, a deterministic specification the output can be tested against.

Outside banking

The frame travels. Insurers, asset managers and payment firms in the UK are not formally in scope of SS1/23 but are asked the same questions by the FCA under the Consumer Duty and by the Senior Managers regime, which attaches personal accountability to the outcomes of an AI-enabled process. Outside financial services, MRM is the most mature template available for the inventory-validate-monitor-own cycle that ISO/IEC 42001 and the NIST AI RMF both describe in more general language, and a governance team that adopts its vocabulary inherits fifteen years of practice.

Where it sits in the register

AI lifecycle controls gap is what an MRM framework exists to close, and AI model drift and degradation and untested AI failure scenarios are the two failures independent validation is meant to catch. Unclear AI ownership and accountability is the governance principle stated as its absence. On the control side: the ownership and accountability framework, AI system monitoring and logging, third-party model due diligence, and incident response and rollback for the day a model has to come out of service.

AI Assurance Risk & Assurance
The work of measuring, evaluating and communicating whether an AI system, or the organisation running it, meets the claims made for it, so that others can rely on those claims. It spans internal testing through to independent audit and certification, and the question it answers is not whether a system is good but whether a statement about it can be trusted.
AI Inventory Governance
A maintained register of every AI system, model and AI-enabled feature an organisation uses, builds or buys, with an owner, a purpose, a risk tier and a status for each. It is the first control in every AI governance framework because none of the others can be applied to a system nobody has listed.
Model Drift Operations
A change in the relationship between a model's inputs and the environment it was fitted to, such that the model's assumptions no longer hold. The model itself is unchanged; the world it was trained on has moved.
Model Versioning Operations
The practice of recording which model, trained how and on what, was deployed when, enabling comparison, rollback and reproducibility. For systems built on models the organisation did not train, it extends to versioning the surrounding assembly, since that is the only part it controls.
PRA SS1/23 Compliance & Regulation
The Prudential Regulation Authority's supervisory statement setting out five principles for model risk management at UK banks. It took effect on 17 May 2024, applies to AI and machine learning models as to any other model, and was amended in April 2026.
Risk Appetite Governance
The level and types of risk an organisation is willing to accept in pursuit of its strategic objectives. Applied to AI, a single organisational posture is rarely enough: appetite has to be set separately across distinct risk dimensions and tiers of decision consequence.
Third-Party Risk Risk & Assurance
The exposure an organisation carries through dependencies on external parties who build, train, host or operate the AI systems it uses. In AI the exposure is characteristically deeper than the contract: beneath most vendors sits a model provider, and beneath that an infrastructure provider.
Three Lines of Defence Risk & Assurance
The risk governance model used across UK financial services, in which the business owns and manages risk, an independent risk and compliance function oversees it, and internal audit gives the board independent assurance. Applied to AI, it decides who owns a model, who challenges it and who checks both.

Related risks and controls

AI system lifecycle controls gapRisk
What an MRM framework exists to close.
AI model drift and degradationRisk
The failure ongoing validation is meant to catch.
Untested AI failure scenariosRisk
The failure initial validation is meant to catch.
Unclear AI ownership and accountabilityRisk
SS1/23's governance principle, stated as its absence.
Inadequate independent model validationRisk
Independent validation, a core part of the discipline.
Model not fit for its intended purposeRisk
A model that is wrong for its purpose.
Use beyond validated scopeRisk
A model used outside the scope it was validated for.
Model interdependency and aggregationRisk
Risk that arises from models feeding one another.
AI ownership and accountability frameworkControl
SS1/23 principle 2: the board owns the framework, senior management owns the models.
AI system monitoring and loggingControl
Ongoing validation needs a record to validate against.
Third-party model and vendor due diligenceControl
Validation of a model you did not build starts here.
AI incident response and rollbackControl
For the day a model has to come out of service.
Independent model validationControl
Independent model validation.
AI risk tiering and classificationControl
Tiering, which sets the depth of validation and review.
Periodic AI review and recertificationControl
Periodic review and recertification.

Further reading

AI Governance in UK Financial Services: The Regimes That Already ApplyArticle
The UK has decided not to write an AI Act for financial services. That is not the relief it sounds like. Five existing regimes already bind AI in regulated firms, one of them has required a board-approved model risk appetite since May 2024, and UK lenders and insurers serving EU customers sit inside the EU AI Act whatever Westminster does.

Sources

  1. PS6/23 and SS1/23: Model risk management principles for banks(opens in a new tab) Bank of England (PRA) · 2023-05-17
  2. LIAF01/26: Low Impact Amendments Finalisation April 2026(opens in a new tab) Bank of England (PRA) · 2026-04-23

How to cite

Axiom Verity (2026). Model Risk Management (MRM). Reference Library, G-056. https://axiom-verity.com/glossary/model-risk-management. Reviewed 2026-10-07.