Control · C-031 · Security & Resilience
Model and data access control
Access to model weights, training data, pipelines and inference endpoints is granted by role, limited to need, logged and reviewed.
- Control type
- Preventive
- Family
- Risks addressed
- 4
- Audience
- Heads-of · Practitioner
- Frameworks
- Principle 5 · AML.M0005 · AML.M0019
- Responsible AI domain
- Lifecycle stage
- Reviewed
- 2026-11-10
What it does
It applies to AI assets the access discipline already expected for sensitive data and production systems. Weights and training sets are treated as high-value assets with named owners. The practical test is whether the organisation can say, for any model, who could copy it today and who accessed it last month. Security owns the standard; the model owner and data owner approve access to their assets, which is reviewed on the normal entitlement cycle.
How to implement it
- Inventory where weights, adapters, datasets and pipelines are stored.
- Define roles for those who may read, modify, deploy and query each.
- Separate the ability to train a model from the ability to deploy it.
- Encrypt artefacts at rest and in transit.
- Log all access to artefact stores and alert on bulk transfer.
- Require the same of suppliers who hold these assets.
Evidence it operates
Design: an asset inventory with owners and an access model. Operation: current access lists that match approved roles; the latest review with removals; logs of access to artefact stores; an alert raised by a test bulk download.
Where it fits
Set up with the development environment and maintained in production. It is the primary control for model weight theft and AI development environment compromise.
Limits
It does not prevent misuse by someone with legitimate access, nor copying of a model through its public interface. Development environments tend to accumulate exceptions; the control decays without review. Shared storage set up for convenience during a project is the usual source of over-broad access and should be closed when the project ends.
Risks this mitigates
Primary mappings
- AI development environment compromise High
- Restricts and logs access to data, weights and tooling. Training pipelines, notebooks, registries and experiment tooling are less protected than production, giving an attacker a route to data, weights and the deployed model.
- Model weight theft High
- Restricts and logs access to weights wherever they are stored. Proprietary weights or fine-tuned adapters are copied from storage, a pipeline or a supplier, taking the intellectual property and enabling attacks to be developed offline.
Supporting mappings
- Agent identity and privilege abuse High
- Applies role-based access to what agents can reach. An agent inherits, shares or escalates credentials and delegated authority beyond what its task needs, so a compromise or error acts with far wider access than intended.
- Re-identification of anonymised data Medium
- Restricts access to data that could be combined to re-identify. Data treated as anonymous is linked back to individuals, by a model or by combining its outputs with other data.
Framework and clause references
| Framework | Clause | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Code of Practice for the Cyber Security of AI | Principle 5 | Identify, track and protect your assets Protection of assets. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.M0005 | Control Access to AI Models and Data at Rest Access control at rest. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.M0019 | Control Access to AI Models and Data in Production Access control in production. |
Related terms
How to cite
Axiom Verity (2026). Model and data access control. Reference Library, C-031. https://axiom-verity.com/controls/model-and-data-access-control. Reviewed 2026-11-10.
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