Control · C-047 · Model & System Lifecycle

Intended-use definition and use restrictions

The approved purpose, users, population and conditions of use of each AI system are stated precisely, and any use outside them requires reassessment before it begins.

Control type
Directive
Risks addressed
8
Audience
Heads-of · Practitioner
Frameworks
Article 13 · Annex A.9 · MAP 3
Reviewed
2026-11-10

What it does

It fixes what the system was approved to do, so that testing, tiering and legal classification have a defined object and so that a new use is recognisable as new. The business owner writes the definition and is accountable for staying within it; governance approves it and any extension.

How to implement it

  • State the decision or task supported, the users, the people affected, and the operating conditions.
  • State what the system must not be used for.
  • Record the definition in the inventory against the system.
  • Enforce it technically where possible, by restricting access and scope.
  • Require any consumer of the system's output to register its use.
  • Trigger reassessment of tier, validation and classification when use changes.

Evidence it operates

Design: an intended-use statement for each system, approved and held in the inventory. Operation: access lists consistent with the stated users; a register of consuming systems; a record of a proposed new use that was assessed before it started.

Where it fits

Written at the start of the lifecycle, confirmed at approval and revisited on change. It is the primary control for use beyond validated scope, and it supplies the reference point for pre-deployment testing and validation.

Limits

A statement does not stop misuse; it makes misuse identifiable. Definitions written broadly to avoid future approvals defeat the purpose. General-purpose systems will attempt any request, so the restriction has to be enforced around the model and not expected of it. Outputs that are copied into spreadsheets or reports travel beyond any technical restriction.

Risks this mitigates

Primary mappings

Out-of-scope responses Medium
Defines the domain the system may answer in. A system answers questions outside its intended domain, where it has not been tested and the organisation has no authority or competence to assist.
Unauthorised commitments by agents High
Defines what the agent has authority to do. An agent makes a statement, offer or transaction that binds the organisation, without the authority a person in the same position would need.
Unsuitable AI-generated advice or guidance High
Defines whether the system may give advice at all, and within what limits. A system gives personalised recommendations in a regulated domain without the suitability process, permissions or accuracy that advice requires.
Use beyond validated scope High
States the approved purpose, users and population, with reuse requiring reassessment. A model approved for one purpose is reused for another, or for a new population, without reassessment.

Supporting mappings

Abuse of a deployed AI service Medium
States what the service is for, giving a basis to refuse other uses. Users turn the organisation's AI system to purposes it was never offered for, including generating harmful material, at the organisation's cost and in its name.
Excessive agency in autonomous agents High
Defines the scope the agent is allowed to act within. An agent is given more functions, permissions or independence than its task requires, so an error, an ambiguous instruction or a manipulated input turns into a damaging action that no one approved.
Inference of sensitive attributes High
Excludes sensitive inference from the approved purpose. A system infers health, beliefs, sexual orientation or other special category information about a person from data that does not state it.
Model not fit for its intended purpose High
States the purpose against which fitness is judged. A model is deployed without evidence that it performs well enough for the specific task, population and conditions in which it is used.

Framework and clause references

FrameworkClauseTitle
EU AI ActArticle 13Transparency and provision of information to deployers Intended purpose in instructions for use.
ISO/IEC 42001:2023Annex A.9Use of AI systems Intended use.
NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)MAP 3Capabilities, intended use, benefits and costs are understood Intended use understood.

How to cite

Axiom Verity (2026). Intended-use definition and use restrictions. Reference Library, C-047. https://axiom-verity.com/controls/intended-use-definition. Reviewed 2026-11-10.