Control · C-028 · Monitoring, Assurance & Incidents
Agent action tracing
Every agent action is recorded with the instruction, plan, tool call, result and identity that produced it, in a form that allows the sequence to be reconstructed.
- Control type
- Detective
- Risks addressed
- 9
- Audience
- Heads-of · Practitioner
- Frameworks
- Article 12 · AML.M0024 · Accountability
- Responsible AI domain
- Lifecycle stage
- Reviewed
- 2026-11-10
What it does
It makes agent behaviour examinable after the fact. It is what allows an incident to be investigated, a decision to be explained to the person it affected, a rogue pattern to be detected, and the other controls in this category to be evidenced. Engineering operates it continuously; the agent's owner is accountable for the record.
How to implement it
- Capture for each task: the request and requester, the agent's plan, each tool call with parameters and result, any approval, and the final output.
- Carry one identifier across the task, including delegation to sub-agents.
- Record the model, prompt and component versions in force.
- Store traces in the organisation's own systems, protected from alteration.
- Set retention by the period in which the action may be disputed.
- Feed traces to monitoring that looks for departures from mandate.
Evidence it operates
Design: a tracing standard listing the required fields and retention. Operation: for a sample of past agent actions, the full sequence from request to effect can be reconstructed from stored records alone; trace volumes reconcile to action volumes; an attempt to alter a stored trace is detected.
Where it fits
Built in at design and running in production. It extends AI system monitoring and logging to the reasoning and delegation that ordinary logs omit, and supplies the audit trail for approval gates.
Limits
A trace records what the agent reported about its reasoning, which may not be how the output was actually produced. Traces contain whatever the agent handled, including personal and confidential data, and need the same protection and retention discipline as the data itself. Tracing detects; it stops nothing by itself.
Risks this mitigates
Primary mappings
- Rogue agent behaviour High
- Records actions so departure from mandate is visible. An agent departs from its intended function or acts deceptively or outside its mandate, through misaligned objectives, emergent behaviour or a compromise that persists, while each action appears legitimate.
- Untraceable agent actions High
- Records each action with the instruction, plan, tool call and identity behind it. Actions taken by agents cannot be reconstructed or attributed to an instruction, a decision and an accountable person, so errors cannot be investigated and accountability fails.
Supporting mappings
- Agent goal hijack High
- Records the instruction that changed the plan. Injected or poisoned content redirects an agent's objective or plan, so the agent pursues an attacker's goal with the organisation's authority and access.
- Agent identity and privilege abuse High
- Attributes every action to an identity. An agent inherits, shares or escalates credentials and delegated authority beyond what its task needs, so a compromise or error acts with far wider access than intended.
- Agent memory and context poisoning High
- Shows when a memory entry was written and by what. False or hostile content is written into an agent's persistent memory or shared context, so later sessions and other users inherit corrupted instructions or facts.
- Agent tool misuse High
- Records each call for investigation. An agent uses a tool it is permitted to use in an unsafe or unintended way, such as a destructive command or a wrong parameter, causing data loss, unauthorised transactions or disruption.
- Function-calling hallucination Medium
- Shows which calls were actually executed. An agent invents a tool, a parameter or the result of a call, and the fabricated step is executed or relied on as though it had happened.
- Insecure inter-agent communication Medium
- Records exchanges between agents. Messages between agents are not authenticated, authorised or validated, so one compromised or spoofed agent can instruct the others.
- Record-keeping and logging failure High
- Extends the record to agent actions. The system does not automatically record the events needed to reconstruct what it did, or the logs are not retained for as long as they may be needed.
Framework and clause references
| Framework | Clause | Title |
|---|---|---|
| EU AI Act | Article 12 | Record-keeping Recording of events. |
| MITRE ATLAS | AML.M0024 | AI Telemetry Logging and Monitoring Telemetry. |
| OECD AI Principles | Accountability | Accountability Traceability. |
Related terms
How to cite
Axiom Verity (2026). Agent action tracing. Reference Library, C-028. https://axiom-verity.com/controls/agent-action-tracing. Reviewed 2026-11-10.
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